The Replying Game: Making the Case for Adopting the Fifth Circuit\u27s Use of Particularized Replies in § 1983 Actions by Long, Michael T.G.
  
 
389 
The Replying Game:                                                            
Making the Case for Adopting the Fifth Circuit’s Use of 
Particularized Replies in § 1983 Actions 
Michael T.G. Long∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the 
“Rules”) in 1938, a plaintiff attempting to avail herself of federal 
court has, in most circumstances, needed only to plead a “short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”1  As the qualifier “in most circumstances” suggests, there are 
exceptions; the question is whether § 1983 actions2 against 
government officials for civil rights violations should be one of those 
exceptions.  Qualified immunity,3 a defense to § 1983 claims, often 
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 1 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  This minimal pleading requirement is commonly 
referred to as “notice pleading.”  See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).  
Reversing dismissal for failure to plead specific facts, the Supreme Court determined 
that “all the Rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the 
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Swierkiewicz 
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002).  For a further exploration of notice 
pleading, see infra Part II.D. 
 2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private right of action against any “person” who, 
acting “under the color of” state authority, violates the constitutional or federal 
rights of a United States citizen.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).  For a more in-depth 
description of § 1983 claims, see infra Part III.  A Bivens action, the federal analog to 
a § 1983 action, may be brought by a citizen whose civil rights are violated by a 
federal, rather than state, official.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).  Although this Comment focuses on § 1983 actions, the 
logic, at least with regard to pleading standards, is equally applicable to Bivens 
actions.  See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500-01 (1978) (acknowledging 
that there is no justification for treating Bivens claims different from § 1983 claims in 
most instances). 
 3 Qualified immunity is a judicially-created affirmative defense that must be 
raised by the government defendant in the answer to a § 1983 claim.  Siegert v. 
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).  
It is available to government officials performing discretionary functions “insofar as 
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provides government officials total freedom from suit, rather than 
merely freedom from liability.4  Because of this, many lower federal 
courts have struggled to find ways to dispose of civil rights cases at an 
early juncture.5  Until recently, the majority of lower federal courts 
responded by requiring that the plaintiff plead in factual detail at the 
outset of the litigation; failure to do so resulted in a judgment on the 
pleadings, ending the plaintiff’s action.6 
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court in 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit7 
and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.8 have severely undermined the practice 
of demanding that the plaintiff plead specific facts in the complaint.9  
In Leatherman, the Court unanimously rejected a heightened pleading 
standard when a § 1983 complaint is brought against a municipality.10  
The Court expressly declined to decide, however, whether a 
heightened pleading standard was permissible in cases against 
 
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982).  For a further examination of immunity defenses, see infra Part III. 
 4 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (describing qualified immunity as 
“an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability”). 
 5 See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (advocating the early use of summary 
judgment and holding that “[u]ntil this threshold immunity question is resolved, 
discovery should not be allowed”); Elliot v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992) (rejecting a heightened pleading standard 
in favor of aggressive use of summary judgment); Connelly v. Comptroller of the 
Currency, 876 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the court must be able 
at the outset of the litigation to ascertain with factual certainty what transpired). 
 6 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c); see also, e.g., Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep’t, 
958 F.2d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1992) (requiring plaintiff to meet a heightened pleading 
standard in the complaint in suits “in which an immunity defense can be raised”); 
Hunter v. Dist. of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69, 75-77 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (requiring 
particularized pleading in all § 1983 claims regardless of whether the qualified 
immunity defense is raised); Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(adopting a “heightened pleading standard in [Bivens] cases in which subjective 
intent is an element of a constitutional tort action”). 
 7 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 8 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 9 See infra Parts IV.C and D (discussing Leatherman and Swierkiewicz). 
 10 507 U.S. at 168 (1993) (“We think that it is impossible to square the 
‘heightened pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the 
liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules”).  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, explained that municipalities have neither absolute 
nor qualified immunity that would preclude a suit.  Id. at 166.  Rather, the primary 
issue in a § 1983 claim against a municipality is whether the municipality’s officials 
were acting in accordance with a municipal custom or policy when the alleged 
constitutional injury occurred.  Id.; see also infra note 232 (comparing § 1983 claims 
against municipalities with those against government officials).  For a further 
discussion of Leatherman, see infra Part IV.C. 
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government officials.11  Several courts have exploited this apparent 
loophole by continuing to require that the complaint be 
particularized in suits against officials.12 
In Swierkiewicz, the Court revisited the permissibility of a lower 
court’s imposition of a heightened pleading standard despite no 
express authority in the Rules, this time in the employment 
discrimination context.13  The Court in Swierkiewicz, as in Leatherman, 
did not directly address the appropriate level of specificity required 
in a plaintiff’s complaint in a § 1983 suit against a government 
official.14  The Court’s message, however, was unequivocal: absent a 
statute or a Rule to the contrary, a federal court cannot on its own 
authority insist on a heightened pleading standard.15 
After Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, the loophole by which some 
lower federal courts have distinguished their heightened pleading 
practices from those discredited by the Supreme Court is closing, if 
not completely shut.16  The Fifth Circuit, in Schultea v. Wood,17 
responded18 by devising a novel way of bringing to light specific 
 
 11 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166-67. 
 12 For courts that have continued, post-Leatherman, to require a heightened 
pleading standard in § 1983 actions against government officials, see, for example, 
Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 907 (10th Cir. 2000) (“We have continued to apply this 
heightened pleading requirement to § 1983 claims alleging a conspiracy between 
private individuals and state officials even after Leatherman . . . .”); GJR Invs., Inc. v. 
County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he heightened 
pleading requirement is the law of this circuit.”).  For courts that have rejected a 
heightened pleading standard after Leatherman, see, for example, Atchinson v. Dist. 
of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2002); Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1996); Jordan v. Jackson, 15 
F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1994); Goad v. Mitchell, 297 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2002); Walker v. 
Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); Harris v. St. Louis Police Dep’t, 164 F.3d 
1085 (8th Cir. 1998); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
 13 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508. 
 14 See id. 
 15 Id. at 515 (“A requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result 
that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules and not by 
judicial interpretation.’” (quoting Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168)).  For a further 
exploration of Swierkiewicz, see infra Part IV.D. 
 16 The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has been particularly reluctant to 
relinquish its heightened pleading standard for complaints alleging § 1983 claims 
against government officials, but the circuit appears to have retrenched.  See Marsh v. 
Butler County, 225 F.3d 1243, 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000).  For an excellent account 
of the enduring uncertainty in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisprudence in this area, see 
Elizabeth J. Norman & Jacob E. Daly, Statutory Civil Rights, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1499, 
1504-10 (2002). 
 17 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 18 To be sure, Swierkiewicz was decided almost seven years after Schultea and, 
therefore, it is somewhat misleading to call the latter a “response” to the former.  
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factual allegations at the pleading stage: the “three-step” pleading 
scheme.19 
According to the scheme, the plaintiff, in the complaint, first 
must plead a “short and plain statement” per Rule 8(a)(2),20 alleging 
a § 1983 claim against the defendant government official.21  Second, if 
the defendant seeks to assert the affirmative defense of qualified 
immunity, she must do so in the answer.22  In the third step, the court 
directs the plaintiff to file a seldom-used Rule 723 reply that is 
“tailored to the assertion of qualified immunity and fairly engages its 
allegations.”24 
This Comment assesses the suitability of the three-step pleading 
scheme and ultimately concludes that the scheme strikes a desirable 
balance between the policies that underlie government immunity and 
notice pleading.  Part II provides a brief history of pleading and 
procedural systems.  Part III recounts the development of qualified 
immunity doctrine in § 1983 actions.  Part IV explores the tense 
policy conflict between qualified immunity and notice pleading as 
demonstrated by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.  In Part V, 
this Comment analyzes the three-step pleading scheme presented in 
Schultea, in light of Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, and determines that 
the Fifth Circuit has exceeded the authority conferred by the Rules.  
Nevertheless, this Comment advocates the three-step scheme as a 
middle-ground solution that preserves qualified immunity as a 
threshold barrier against meritless litigation and helps to maintain a 
 
Nonetheless, Schultea was a direct response to Leatherman, which was in turn 
reaffirmed and arguably broadened by Swierkiewicz.  Compare Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1333 
(presenting the three-step scheme as the Firth Circuit’s “answer to Leatherman”), with 
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 (reaffirming Leatherman). 
 19 See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1432-33.  Although Circuit Judge Higginbotham 
referred to the scheme as having only two steps, the complaint and the reply, id. at 
1433-34, this Comment will refer to the practice as the three-step scheme.  This is 
because the government defendant must file an answer (i.e., the second step) 
between the complaint and reply.  Id. at 1434. 
 20 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 21 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433. 
 22 See id. at 1433.  This presumes, of course, that the defendant will plead 
qualified immunity in the answer.  See id.  If the defendant does not do so, there 
would generally be no need for a Rule 7 reply.  See infra Part V.C (recommending 
that the three-step scheme only be triggered “where the defense of qualified 
immunity is raised in the answer”).  But see infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text 
(describing the uses of the reply under the current pleading regime, including 
mandatory replies in response to counterclaims).  Thus, when a defendant does not 
assert qualified immunity, there would be no need to apply the three-step scheme at 
all.  See infra Part V.C. 
 23 FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a). 
 24 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433. 
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uniform and functional pleading regime.  To ensure that the practice 
complies with the Court’s mandate in Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, this 
Comment concludes by endorsing the adoption of a version25 of the 
three-step pleading scheme.  This Comment maintains, however, that 
this can only be accomplished legitimately by amending the Rules 
rather than by imposing the scheme through independent judicial 
implementation. 
II.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE NOTICE PLEADING REGIME 
Legal procedure in the United States has always been a moving 
target, albeit a somewhat slow one.26  Over the last four hundred 
years, the trappings of traditional sources of procedure have 
seemingly been shaken off in the name of reform, only to reemerge 
as problematic but enduring features of the reformed alternatives.27  
During this fitful evolution, pleadings, while still required, have 
greatly diminished in importance.28  Under modern civil procedure, 
the pleading stage is no longer permeated by legal pitfalls and 
meaningless technicalities; at the very least, the pleadings themselves 
are not required to contain some “magical words,” the exclusion of 
which may result in immediate and permanent disposition of the 
lawsuit.29 
A liberalized pleading regime has produced estimable benefits 
 
 25 See infra notes 380-84, 388, and accompanying text (proposing a mandatory 
reply to a qualified immunity assertion rather than a permissive reply under the 
current Schultea scheme). 
 26 Although an understanding of the change from distinct common law and 
equity procedural systems to various combined forms, culminating with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, is helpful to appreciate the complexities and consequences 
of different pleading regimes, a truly thorough account is outside the scope of this 
Comment.  Instead, this Comment provides only a summary version.  See infra Part II.  
For a further exploration of the history of the current federal pleading regime, see 
generally DAVID W. LOUSELL ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 18-29 (6th ed. 1989); 
LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 6-18 (1997); Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1040-45 (1982); 
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
 27 See Subrin, supra note 26, at 931-43; see also infra Parts II.B, C, and D (discussing 
how successor procedural systems have retained remnants of common law pleading). 
 28 See LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 28 (describing the Rules as requiring “little 
more than broad and vague statements of claim and defense”). 
 29 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the 
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be 
decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to 
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”); see also, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) 
(providing liberal rules for amending pleadings). 
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for the American legal system.30  Nevertheless, some of the discarded 
and discredited practices of the previous era—particularly an 
increased role for pleadings like the reply—can perhaps again be 
useful in certain instances, especially when substantive immunity 
rights collide with countervailing modern procedural devices.31  
Understanding how the Schultea three-step pleading scheme can 
alleviate the tension between qualified immunity and notice 
pleading32 requires a brief review of the history of pleading and 
procedure in the United States. 
A. Common Law Pleading and Procedure 
Prior to the adoption of the Rules, the early American legal 
system was largely dominated by the procedural system inherited 
from English common law.33  Suits at law shared three main features: 
the writ system, the use of juries, and technical pleading.34  Initiating 
a lawsuit required obtaining the issuance of an administrative order, 
or writ.35  Each writ attempted to integrate substance, procedure, and 
remedy into a single form; the particular writ chosen by the aggrieved 
party determined the single claim brought before the court, the 
method by which the case was heard, and the available relief should 
that party prevail.36  By selecting a writ, the plaintiff was required to 
 
 30 See Stephen N. Subrin, Fireworks on the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 73 JUDICATURE 4, 4-6 (1989) (recounting scholars’ statements in support of 
the Rules and providing examples of scenarios where procedural liberalization has 
improved the litigation process). 
 31 See infra Parts IV and V; see also Robert L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 463-64 (1986) 
(asserting that additional pleading of facts may help dispose of meritless civil rights 
claims at an early point); Subrin, supra note 26, at 992-94, 1000-02 (highlighting 
criticism of the Rules’ “overworked” procedural flexibility and reminding the legal 
community that “there is another rich tradition [common law] to draw upon” for 
refining civil procedure). 
 32 See infra Part V (explaining the three-step scheme’s potential role in resolving 
issues of qualified immunity that arise in a notice pleading regime). 
 33 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 26, at 926-28. 
 34 Id. at 914; see also LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 22-24 (providing an overview 
of the features of common law procedures); S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 60-81 (2d ed. 1981) (same). 
 35 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 22. 
 36 See id. at 19-20; STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 387-88 (5th ed. 2000); 
Subrin, supra note 26, at 914-18, 929.  In addition to rigidly fixing substance and 
remedy to a given procedure, every writ had a different procedure.  LOUSELL ET AL., 
supra note 26, at 20.  The variation in procedure existed for many reasons, including 
the diverse sources of writs and the historical period when a writ emerged.  Id.  
Accordingly, the common law writ system and its enduring legacy in the English and 
American legal systems have been characterized in part as “the result of a historical 
accident.” TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 6.  For a further exploration of various 
  
2003 COMMENT 395 
make a claim that fit within that writ’s subject matter and could not 
bring another claim under another writ.37 
After the writ had been issued, the parties exchanged a series of 
pleadings in an attempt to refine the suit to a single issue.38  The 
pleadings were intended to ferret out the facts to determine whether, 
if true, they would allow the pleader to recover and whether there 
were any facts in dispute.39  In a typical action, the plaintiff would first 
submit a “declaration”: a factually detailed account of the 
circumstances underlying the writ.40  The plaintiff’s declaration could 
not, at this point, deviate from the writ; alternative and cumulative 
claims or “counts” were not permitted.41  Next, the defendant might 
have responded with a “general demurrer,” which admitted all of the 
plaintiff’s factual allegations and challenged a point of law.42  Or the 
defendant could have filed a “traverse,” forgoing a challenge of the 
law and instead denying a fact (but then only one fact).43  If the 
defendant chose either to demur or to traverse, the suit was 
effectively reduced to a single issue of law or fact, respectively.44 
Instead, however, the defendant could have issued a plea in 
“confession and avoidance,” admitting the allegations contained in a 
prior pleading in an attempt to avoid the legal consequences of those 
allegations by introducing “new matter.”45  By pleading in confession 
and avoidance, the defendant did not reduce the suit to a single 
issue; the plaintiff, therefore, was required to respond.46  In response, 
the plaintiff could either demur to the defendant’s new matter 
(raising a single legal issue) or file a “replication.”47  The plaintiff’s 
replication either traversed one of the defendant’s facts (raising a 
single fact issue) or acted as a confession and avoidance itself, 
 
writs, their historical origins, and reasons for selecting a particular writ, see id. at 6-9. 
 37 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 22. 
 38 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 10-11. 
 39 Subrin, supra note 26, at 916. 
 40 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 10.  In early English common law, 
declarations were oral.  Id.  Over time, for convenience and other reasons, oral 
declarations were replaced by written pleadings.  Id. 
 41 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 22. 
 42 The modern analog to a demurrer is typically known as a motion to dismiss, 
though some court systems retain the old moniker.  TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, 
at 11. 
 43 Id. at 10.  The traverse is analogous to a simple denial.  Id. at 11. 
 44 Id. at 10. 
 45 Id.  The modern equivalent of entering a plea in confession and avoidance is 
pleading an affirmative defense.  Id. at 11. 
 46 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 10. 
 47 Id. 
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admitting the defendant’s allegations and again raising a new 
matter.48  If the replication raised a new matter of confession and 
avoidance, the defendant was obligated either to respond with a 
demurrer (again, reducing the suit to single legal issue) or to file a 
“rejoinder,” which operated like a replication by either traversing a 
fact (isolating a single fact issue) or raising another new matter of 
confession and avoidance.49  This continued until the lawsuit was 
refined to a single issue.50 
As this brief example demonstrates, common law pleading often 
became dizzyingly complex.51  Attempting to reach a single issue in 
order to secure easier adjudication, the pleading rules instead 
created a morass where a false step could easily cost a party the case 
for entirely technical reasons.52  Additional restrictions were imposed 
on lawsuits to keep them relatively simple; parties, for example, were 
deemed so inherently conflicted that they were generally not 
permitted to testify.53  Common law also restricted the joinder of 
parties, an offshoot of the single issue rule for claims.54  Historian 
Frederic W. Maitland characterized the writ system by stating that 
“discretion is entirely excluded; all is to be fixed by iron rules.”55  
Dissatisfaction with the harshness of common law procedure grew in 
the United States,56 and popular reform movements sprung up with 
the goal of disentangling procedure from substance.57 
 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id.  This portion of the Comment borrows a great deal from an excellent 
sample pleading exchange provided by Professors Teply and Whitten.  See id. at 10-
11. 
 51 Subrin, supra note 26, at 917. 
 52 Id.  Although the convoluted English writ system was never imported wholesale 
into American procedure, early informal colonial practices did eventually give way to 
a greater prevalence of English procedural rules and forms.  Id. at 927. 
 53 See id. at 919. 
 54 See id. 
 55 FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: 
TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 298 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1920). 
 56 Subrin, supra note 26, at 929-31.  Reformers “complained that the common 
law, and methods designed to circumvent that law, had resulted in a system that 
obscured facts and legal issues, rather than distilling and clarifying them.”  Id. at 932-
33. 
 57 Id.  Among the factors that provided pressure to integrate law and equity 
during the nineteenth century, Professor Subrin cites separation of powers issues 
that arose as legislators (at the expense of common law judges) became more 
involved with the process of law-making, the advent of the law school model over the 
apprenticeship model for the instruction of law, and issues of federalism that 
emerged after the establishment of a separate federal court system.  Id. at 929-31. 
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B. Equity Pleading and Procedure 
Equity courts, with their own procedure, jurisdiction, substantive 
field, and remedies, developed distinctly but in parallel to common 
law courts.58  Although equity never took hold in early American legal 
history as strongly as it did in England,59 it was nevertheless imported 
into most American states.60  Typically, law judges were allowed to 
hear special cases in equity61 or, as in England, the state created an 
equity court system entirely distinct from the common law court 
system.62 
From the outset, equity contrasted starkly with common law.63  
Because equity emerged as an alternative to common law, petitioners 
sought the intervention of the King’s Council (and later specifically 
the Chancellor) when the rigid common law writ system appeared to 
offer inadequate or nonexistent relief.64  Consequently, equity, unlike 
common law, was not fixated on pinning down and resolving a single 
issue between only two parties; rather, equitable actions encompassed 
multiple issues and parties.65  Additionally, the Chancellor had the 
authority to fashion specific remedies rather than simply award the 
ordinary legal remedy, monetary damages.66  Court orders in equity 
frequently involved affirmative commands compelling the losing 
party to right past wrongs (and prevent future ones) by performing 
 
 58 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 24-25; Subrin, supra note 26, at 918-19.  
Pinpointing precisely when, in English history, equity established a distinct court 
system has confounded historians and legal scholars.  See MILSOM, supra note 34, at 82 
(“Few beginnings are so elusive as that of the chancellor’s equitable jurisdiction . . . 
.”).  Records, though disjointed and incomplete, nevertheless suggest that equity 
courts may have been distinct from law courts as early as the fourteenth century.  See 
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 12 (“[Equity] was recognized as a separate court 
in about the middle of the fourteenth century.”). 
 59 See LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 26; see also Subrin, supra note 26, at 926 
(reporting that “many colonists distrusted separate equity courts . . . [because equity] 
represented uncontrolled discretion and needless expense and delay”). 
 60 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 14. 
 61 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 26; Subrin, supra note 26, at 928. 
 62 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 26; Subrin, supra note 26, at 928.  
Pennsylvania, for example, did not establish equity courts until after 1800.  LOUSELL 
ET AL., supra note 26, at 26.  In New York, state trial courts simply assumed the dual 
powers of equity and common law.  Id. 
 63 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 24-25. 
 64 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 12; see also 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 3 (2003) 
(“[T]he primary character of equity . . . [is] that it seeks to reach and do complete 
justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power 
to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to 
do.”). 
 65 Subrin, supra note 26, at 919-20. 
 66 Id. at 919. 
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or not performing specific acts.67 
Equity actions, like lawsuits, involved pleadings.68  A petitioner 
initiated an action in equity by filing a “petition” or bill.69  The 
defendant was then required to submit an “answer.”70  If further 
pleadings were needed to clarify the parties’ positions, the plaintiff 
would file a rejoinder to which the defendant would respond with a 
replication.71  Although superficially similar to the writ system, equity 
pleading was not nearly so rigidly formulaic.72  The petition, for 
instance, needed not contain the specific facts that, if true, would 
satisfy an ill-fitting cause of action that existed under a writ; rather, 
the petition often contained more background information, 
including details of the petitioner’s sympathetic circumstances.73  The 
petitioner included this background information in an attempt to 
convince the Chancellor that leaving the petitioner to an unforgiving 
common law system would result in an injustice.74 
Pleadings, however, were not equity’s predominant mode of 
winnowing issues before trial.75  Rather, the Chancellor had the 
power to compel (with “subpoenas” and “interrogatories”) either 
party to appear and respond under oath to every allegation contained 
in the other party’s pleadings.76  Additionally, the Chancellor could 
compel either party to answer other specific questions put forward by 
the other party or the Chancellor himself.77  Equity did not permit 
testimony in open court, but rather parties provided documentary 
answers.78  The power to ask specific questions—and to receive 
compelled answers—allowed the questioning party (typically the 
plaintiff) to obtain admissions of fact that at law were unavailable.79 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id.  But cf. Subrin, supra note 26, at 921 (questioning the purported distinctions 
between equity and legal procedure and noting that “equity often developed its own 
formal rules of both substance and process”). 
 73 Subrin, supra note 26, at 919. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25. 
 76 Subrin, supra note 26, at 919. 
 77 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25; Subrin, supra note 26, at 919.  Professor 
Subrin identifies these compelled documentary answers as “the precursor to modern 
pretrial discovery.”  Id.  The process usually focused on the defendant, whose 
“conscience” was searched.  Id.; LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25.  This led to 
equity courts being labeled “courts of conscience.”  Id. 
 78 Subrin, supra note 26, at 919. 
 79 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25. 
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This dynamic allowed equity to develop substantive doctrines 
that were foreign to common law.80  Claims of fraud or breach of 
fiduciary duty, for example, would be difficult if not impossible to 
prove if, as in suits at law, the plaintiff could neither testify on her 
own behalf nor compel the defendant to answer direct questions.81  
The Chancellor’s power to craft remedies that compelled further 
action or inaction first enabled and then enhanced the creation of 
these new doctrines.82  There would be no satisfactory method of 
enforcing a trust, for example, if equity could not issue orders 
requiring “specific performance.”83 
Equity, despite its flexibility and goal of justice, was not without 
its critics; overwhelmingly, equity cases were exceptionally costly, 
slow, and unwieldy.84  The general exclusion of juries as fact-finders 
caused concern that too much discretion (and the potential for 
abuses of that discretion) resided in the Chancellor (and later in law 
judges sitting in equity).85  Notwithstanding these enduring criticisms, 
principles of substantive and procedural equity would nonetheless 
influence the reform movements that followed.86 
C. Code Pleading and Procedure 
In an attempt to blend law and equity into a unified and 
standardized procedural system, reformers developed code pleading 
systems as replacements for American common law procedure.87  
Most notable among these was the Field Code (the “Code).88  
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id.; see also MILSOM, supra note 34, at 85-86 (describing how the difficulties of 
bringing claims such as the “tort of deceit” in common law courts were alleviated by 
equity). 
 82 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25. 
 83 Subrin, supra note 26, at 919. 
 84 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 47-48 (1972); see also 
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 26 (stating that by the nineteenth century equity 
“suits took decades or more to reach finality”); Subrin, supra note 26, at 937 
(“[C]omplaints about the expense, delay, and unwieldiness of equity cases were 
legion.”).  In addition to the inherent demands on time and resources that larger 
and more complex suits imposed, Professor Subrin also assigns blame for the often 
inexorable delay on the Chancellor “who resolved—often in a most leisurely 
manner—issues of both law and fact.”  Id. at 920. 
 85 See Subrin, supra note 26, at 926-27, 928. 
 86 See id. at 956. 
 87 Subrin, supra note 26, at 931. 
 88 Developed primarily by (and named after) David Dudley Field, the Field Code 
was adopted by New York in 1848.  Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal 
Rules, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1955).  The Code was eventually adopted in 
around half of the states, covering more than half of the United States population.  
  
400 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:389 
Codification, however, produced mixed results at best.89  The Code, 
for example, incorporated many features of equity by eliminating the 
writ system in favor of a single mode of procedure for all legal and 
equitable actions and by liberalizing the choice of remedy. 90  The 
Code reduced pleadings to the “complaint,” the “answer,” and the 
“reply,” reformed the rules of party and claim joinder, and made 
amending pleadings easier.91  But the Code also differed from equity 
in important ways: discovery devices were severely limited and juries 
were given prominent roles.92  Significantly, the Code also eliminated 
directed verdicts.93  In general, flexibility and discretion, the 
hallmarks of equity, were in large part removed from the province of 
the judge.94 
Although reducing the pleadings in number, the Code laid the 
groundwork for renewed technical pleading.95  A complaint was 
required to contain “facts constituting the cause of action.”96  David 
Dudley Field, the principal architect of the Code, regarded “facts” or 
“ultimate facts” as the objective, determinable truth;97 pleadings, 
therefore, were not to contain “evidence” or “conclusions.”98  These 
terms, however, were hardly clear to litigants, lawyers, and jurists; 
much time and energy was spent not only trying to distinguish facts 
from evidence and conclusions but also trying to simply agree on the 
definition of the terms themselves.99  The term “cause of action” 
likewise suffered from definitional problems.100  Derived from and 
 
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 27; Subrin, supra note 26, at 932, 939. 
 89 See Subrin, supra note 26, at 931-39. 
 90 LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 27. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Subrin, supra note 26, at 934. 
 93 Id. at 937. 
 94 Id. at 934, 937.  Field and other codification proponents believed that “to say 
that law is expansive, elastic, or accommodating, is as much to say that it is no law at 
all.”  DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPLETED CIVIL CODE (1865), 
reprinted in SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 
323, 330-31 (A. Sprague ed., 1884), quoted in Subrin, supra note 26, at 934. 
 95 Subrin, supra note 26, at 939-40. 
 96 Id. at 935. 
 97 Id. 
 98 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE  § 1218 (1990). 
 99 Id.; Subrin, supra note 26, at 941.  Professors Wright & Miller explain that “it 
was difficult, if not impossible, to draw meaningful and consistent distinctions among 
‘evidence,’ ‘facts,’ and ‘conclusions.’  These concepts tended to merge to form a 
continuum and no readily apparent dividing markers developed to separate them.”  
5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 98, § 1218. 
 100 Subrin, supra note 26, at 935. 
  
2003 COMMENT 401 
evocative of the old writ system, “cause of action” implied that a 
specific set of facts existed that would prompt judicial action and 
mandate a remedy.101 
Ultimately, despite the goal of demystifying the litigation 
process, the Code and the other codifications suffered from much 
the same defects as common law: they fostered the creation of “traps 
for the unwary or the inexperienced pleader and tactical advantages 
for the adroit pleader that were unrelated to the merits of his 
cause.”102  Piecemeal enactment and repeated amendments in many 
jurisdictions created systems every bit as arcane and complex as the 
writ system.103  One code pleading regime, bloated by inexorable 
amendments, was disdainfully described as “too long, too 
complicated, ‘too minute and technical, and lack[ing] elasticity and 
adaptability.’”104  If nothing else, however, the failure of the code 
pleading system buttressed the subsequent reform movement that 
would finally succeed in breaking American civil procedure away 
from its common law roots.105 
D. Notice Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
In 1934, after years of attempted reform, Congress planted the 
seeds of a radical alteration of the procedural landscape by enacting 
the Rules Enabling Act (the “REA”).106  The REA permitted the 
Supreme Court “to prescribe, by general rules, for the District Courts 
of the United States . . . the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and 
motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law.”107  In 
accordance with the REA, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory 
Committee to draft new uniform procedural rules for federal 
courts.108  The Committee largely adopted the goal of Charles E. 
Clark, a committee member and proponent of a less restrictive 
 
 101 Id. 
 102 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 98, § 1218. 
 103 Subrin, supra note 26, at 940.  The Throop Code, for example, expanded the 
New York Code of Civil Procedure from an original 392 provisions to 3441 provisions 
as amended.  Id.  In addition to sheer mass, the Throop Code was also plagued by 
endemic disorganization: “unrelated matters were side by side—a ‘patent lack of 
arrangement and symmetry.’”  Id. at 941 (quoting President’s Address by J. Newton 
Fiero (Jan. 18, 1893), reprinted in 16 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 48, 50 (1893)). 
 104 Id. (quoting Report of the Committee on Code Revision (1898), 22 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 
170, 175 (1899)) (alteration in original). 
 105 See id. at 940. 
 106 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(1990)). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Subrin, supra note 26, at 970-74. 
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American legal system, to create “a really unified procedure [that] 
would not involve repudiation of the present satisfactory equity rules, 
but merely an expansion of them to all actions.”109 
By successfully merging equity and common law, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, formally adopted in 1938,110 dramatically 
liberalized the early segments of litigation.111  The Rules represented 
a remarkable change in civil practice that was manifested by three 
major developments: the advent of minimal pleadings, the reliance 
on liberal discovery, and the diminishment of juries in favor of judge-
controlled adjudication.112  The overarching goal of the new system 
was that the underlying bases of claims and defenses should be 
brought to light at the discovery stage rather than primarily by the 
pleadings.113  Instead of forcing a set of facts to fit imperfectly into the 
unyielding cause of action prescribed by a particular writ, the 
complaint needs only to contain a brief account of the incident 
showing that the plaintiff has stated a claim that invokes a cognizable 
body of law.114  The Rules hold the defendant to substantially the 
same standard in the answer.115 
Unlike common law and code pleading,116 however, the 
presentation of “new matter” does not automatically trigger another 
round of responsive pleading.117  Although the Rules retained the 
reply (in Rule 7),118 it is mandatory only if the defendant pleads a 
 
 109 Charles E. Clark, The Charles E. Clark Papers, Sterling Memorial Library of 
Yale University, Manuscripts & Archives, Box 108, Folder 40, quoted in Subrin, supra 
note 26, at 971. 
 110 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 16. 
 111 Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil 
Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 986 (1998). 
 112 Id. at 986-88. 
 113 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f) (mandating that “[a]ll 
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice”); 2A JAMES WM. MOORE ET 
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 7.01[1] (2d ed. 1996) (“The broad discovery 
provisions of Rules 26 to 37, together with the pretrial conference under Rule 16, 
have considerably relieved the pleadings of much of the burden of formulating 
issues.”). 
 114 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 115 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).  Rule 8(b) requires a party to “state in short and plain 
terms the party’s defenses to each claim asserted.”  Id. 
 116 See infra Parts II.A and C (discussing common law and code pleading). 
 117 See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a). 
 118 Rule 7 is derived from the Federal Equity Rules of 1912, a liberalized but non-
merged system that served as a precursor to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  2A 
MOORE ET AL., supra note 113, ¶ 7.03.  Equity Rule 31, upon which Rule 7 is based, 
reduced mandatory responsive pleadings to the answer and a reply when the answer 
contained a set-off or counterclaim.  Id.  Otherwise, the court retained discretion to 
order a reply.  Id. 
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counterclaim.119  Otherwise, the plaintiff can file a reply only with 
leave of the court.120  Requiring a reply has been deemed 
extraordinary under modern civil procedure: 
[A] reply to an affirmative defense should not be ordered unless 
there is a clear and convincing factual showing of necessity or other 
extraordinary circumstances of a compelling nature. . . . [A] reply 
is not to be utilized as a substitute for discovery and inspection or for a 
pre-trial hearing.121 
The Rules also preserved a heightened pleading standard in 
limited instances: Rule 9(b) requires that “the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”122  
Rule 9(b) complaints, therefore, must allege each element of fraud 
or mistake.123  For illustration, the Supreme Court has held that the 
elements of fraud are: (1) a false representation (2) regarding a 
material fact (3) made with both knowledge of its falsity (4) and an 
intent to deceive (5) resulting in acts made in reasonable reliance on 
the representation.124  The complaint need not contain specific facts 
on each element or present detailed evidentiary matter.125  Rather, 
the “complaint must adequately specify the statements it claims were 
false or misleading, give particulars as to the respect in which plaintiff 
contends the statements were fraudulent, state when and where the 
statements were made, and identify those responsible for the 
statements.”126  Although requiring heightened pleading, Rule 9(b) is 
nonetheless considered an extension of the notice pleading regime; 
the goal of particularity is not to reduce the suit to a single factual or 
legal issue, but rather to give notice where “slightly more is 
needed.”127 
The objective of this minimal pleading requirement is to give 
 
 119 See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a) (“There shall be . . . a reply to a counterclaim 
denominated as such . . . .”). 
 120 See id. (“No other pleading shall be allowed, except the court may order a reply 
to an answer or a third-party answer.”).  The plaintiff should not file a reply without 
being ordered to do so by the court.  2A MOORE ET AL., supra note 113, ¶ 7.03.  If the 
plaintiff files voluntarily anyway, the court will ignore the unauthorized reply except 
that the court may consider statements by the pleader as admissions against that 
party’s interests, if applicable.  Id. 
 121 Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 24 F.R.D. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) 
(emphasis added). 
 122 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 123 2A MOORE ET AL., supra note 113, ¶ 9.03[2]. 
 124 Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332, 338 (1942). 
 125 2A MOORE ET AL., supra note 113, ¶ 9.03[1]. 
 126 Cosmas v. Hassett, 868 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 127 Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 281, 284 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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the receiving party “notice” of the pleader’s claims or defenses and 
the grounds upon which they rest.128  Then, liberal discovery follows, 
permitting both sides access to the litigants, witnesses, and 
documentary and other evidence.129  This access in turn helps refine 
the claims and defenses and clarify the factual setting from which 
they arise.130  Finally, if, after sufficient discovery, there remains no 
genuine issue of material fact, the judge can forgo a costly and time-
consuming trial by rendering summary judgment where it is 
appropriate.131 
Many legal scholars consider notice pleading to have been a 
huge success.132  If nothing else, it has finally achieved the most 
thorough disengagement of procedure and substance and the most 
stable merger of law and equity.133  Having been adopted wholesale by 
the federal court system and in large parts by most of the states, 
liberalized civil procedure based on the Rules has accumulated 
intellectual and judicial inertia; it is the American procedural 
system.134  It is in this context that recent developments in qualified 
immunity doctrine have emerged.  Before reviewing case law where 
notice pleading and qualified immunity came into direct conflict, 
tracing the sources and examining the contours of prior qualified 
immunity jurisprudence is required. 
III.  THE EVOLUTION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN § 1983 CASES 
Section 1983, on its face, creates liability for any person who acts 
under state authority to deprive a citizen of rights guaranteed under 
federal law or the United States Constitution.135  Nowhere does the 
 
 128 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
 129 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (defining the broad scope of discovery by 
providing that “parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, 
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, 
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or 
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons”); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 
(providing for sanctions the court may impose against parties failing to comply with 
discovery orders). 
 130 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
 131 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).  But cf. Molot, supra note 111, at 988 (arguing that 
summary judgment has proven to be an inadequate device to reduce the number of 
cases from going to trial). 
 132 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 30, at 4 (“The Federal Rules . . . have been a major 
triumph of law reform.”). 
 133 Id. at 5 (“The Federal Rules have not just survived; they have influenced 
procedural thinking in every court in the land (and some in other lands) . . . .”). 
 134 Id. (“[The Rules] have indeed become part of the consciousness of lawyers, 
judges, and scholars who worry about and live with issues of judicial procedure.”). 
 135 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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statute mention an immunity defense for government officials.136  
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1871,137 section 1 of which was codified 
at § 1983, was originally enacted primarily to target state 
governmental officials and agencies specifically.138  Despite this 
distrust of state governments that underlies § 1983, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that immunity of some type is available for 
every government official’s discretionary actions.139 
A. A Doctrinal Shift Toward Cost Avoidance and Early Disposition 
The policies behind official immunity appear relatively 
straightforward.  Because government officials often have to do the 
“dirty work” of public service, the Court recognized that it would be 
an “injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, [to subject] to 
liability an official who is required by the legal obligations of his 
position, to exercise discretion.”140  The Court was also reluctant to 
allow the threat of § 1983 actions to deter officials from exercising 
that discretion.141 
Significantly, the justification for official immunity has shifted 
away from concerns about unfairness to officials and overdeterrence 
of official discretion to instead focus on the costs § 1983 actions 
impose on governments and government officials and, therefore, on 
society.142  These social costs include the actual monetary expenses of 
defending against such lawsuits, the potential distraction of officials 
 
 136 See id. 
 137 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 (1996)). 
 138 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (stating that the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was in response to apprehension that “the claims of citizens 
to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2, at 453-55 (3d ed. 1999) (providing a brief history of § 
1983).  Some commentators have insisted that the Court has either misinterpreted or 
ignored the legislative history of § 1983.  See, e.g., David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 497 (1992) (contending that the Court’s recent qualified immunity decisions 
have created an unstable doctrine that does not reflect Congress’ intent); Gene R. 
Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959 (1987) (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s erratic account of the history of § 1983). 
 139 E.g., Schuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 202, 240 (1974). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id.; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR 
OFFICIAL WRONGS 60-77 (1983) (arguing that personal liability for officials will lead to 
harmfully timid behavior). 
 142 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  For a description of this 
doctrinal shift, see Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment 
and the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 15-20 (1997). 
  
406 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:389 
from their governmental duties, and the deterrence of individuals 
from even serving as public officials.143  The Court has determined 
that these costs are likely to be substantial, especially in light of the 
presumption that the majority of § 1983 claims are meritless.144  Mere 
limitations on liability, therefore, are insufficient to further this policy 
of cost prevention.145  Consequently, the avoidance of social costs 
achieved by the early disposal of claims has become the main thrust 
of the policy for official immunity.146 
The Court’s focus on cost avoidance, rather than on unfairness 
or overdeterrence from action, represents a crucial turning point in 
the development of qualified immunity.147  Arguably, an immunity 
defense that shields officials from liability, rather than entirely from 
suit, can adequately placate the fairness and overdeterrence 
concerns.148  Indeed, it is hardly unfair if the lawsuit does not result in 
liability where there rightly should be none.149  Similarly, it is 
uncertain at best that officials would be overly deterred by the mere 
threat of suit if they knew that they would not ultimately face 
staggering damage awards.150  But, if the imperative is to avoid 
litigation expenses and their collateral social impact completely, 
rather than merely to avert an adverse judgment, then qualified 
immunity becomes much more than freedom from liability or even 
freedom from trial; instead, as the Court has repeatedly held, 
qualified immunity requires total immunity from suit.151  This fixation 
on cost avoidance and early disposition has forced courts to navigate 
the complicated interrelationship between qualified immunity and 
notice pleading.152 
B. Immunity Analysis Reexamined in Light of the Doctrinal Shift 
The Court has carved two official immunity defenses out of § 
 
 143 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 144 Id.  But cf. Chen, supra note 142, at 19 n.92 (disputing the Court’s assumption 
that § 1983 claims are often meritless). 
 145 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 146 See id.; Chen, supra note 142, at 15-20. 
 147 See Chen, supra note 142, at 21. 
 148 Id. at 22. 
 149 Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 652-53 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
 150 Id. at 25. 
 151 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 152 See infra Part IV (recounting the Supreme Court’s recent qualified immunity 
jurisprudence). 
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1983: absolute immunity and qualified immunity.153  In determining 
which immunity applies to a given government official, the court 
looks to the “immunity historically accorded the relevant official at 
common law and the interests behind it.”154  Absolute immunity is 
available to a relatively small number of positions held by government 
officials and only when those officials perform a few prescribed 
functions.155  Judges, for example, are protected by absolute immunity 
for conduct within the scope of their judicial authority.156  In contrast, 
judges are not absolutely immune for actions pursuant to their 
administrative or executive authority; they are, however, still 
accorded qualified immunity for those actions.157 
Qualified immunity is generally available to those officials whose 
discretionary official actions are not absolutely immune.158  Initially, 
 
 153 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.  Absolute immunity, by definition, provides a complete 
exemption from suit for certain types of specified conduct.  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).  In contrast, qualified immunity only precludes 
litigation if a certain set of conditions is present; in the § 1983 context, an official is 
entitled to qualified immunity for her discretionary actions unless she violates a 
citizen’s federal or constitutional rights which were clearly established at the time of 
the violation.  See infra note 167 and accompanying text; see also Susan Zinn & Javier 
Maldonado, Civil Rights, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 481, 488-89 (2000) (summarizing 
immunity defenses available to government defendants). 
 154 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421.  The Court has consistently reaffirmed the common law 
approach to deciding questions of immunity.  See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 
U.S. 574, 594-95 (1998); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997); City of Newport 
v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981).  For a summary of the common law 
approach and some frequent criticisms of it, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 
8.6.1, at 494-97. 
 155 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (advising courts to assess the 
“nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 8.6.2, at 500 (“In applying absolute immunity . . . the 
focus is on the function performed, rather than the title possessed.”). 
 156 See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 
(1967).  In addition, members of Congress and their aides are absolutely immune for 
their legislative functions.  See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 
(1975) (holding that legislative immunity is derived from the Speech and Debate 
Clause of Article I of the Constitution).  State and local legislators, when acting in 
their legislative capacity, receive an analogous absolute immunity protection derived 
from common law.  Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980).  A 
prosecutor’s conduct during an actual prosecution (rather than, say, an 
investigation) is shielded by absolute immunity.  See, e.g., Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511; Imbler, 
424 U.S. 409.  Police officials are absolutely immune for testimony they give as 
witnesses.  Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983).  Finally, the president of the 
United States is absolutely immune from monetary liability for conduct performed 
“while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office.”  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
731, 749 (1982).  For a further discussion of the nuances of absolute immunity, see 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 8.6.2, at 500-12. 
 157 See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228, 230. 
 158 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806-07; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 
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in Schuer v. Rhodes,159 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could 
overcome qualified immunity by showing that either: (1) the official 
had no reasonable grounds to believe her conduct comported with 
the law (the objective prong); or (2) that the official subjectively did 
not have a good faith belief that her conduct was lawful (the 
subjective prong).160  The subjective prong could be fulfilled if the 
official was motivated by bad faith to deprive the victim of 
constitutional or statutory rights.161  Satisfying either prong, however, 
merely allowed the plaintiff to defeat qualified immunity; proof at 
trial (or sufficient for the plaintiff to prevail at summary judgment) of 
an actual constitutional or statutory violation that caused the 
plaintiff’s alleged damages was still required for recovery.162 
Due to the policy shift to cost avoidance, Schuer’s alternative 
objective/subjective test was replaced in Harlow v. Fitzgerald163 to more 
easily achieve early disposition of suits.164  In Harlow, A. Ernest 
Fitzgerald, an Air Force analyst, lost his job in a department 
reorganization.165  Fitzgerald sued two presidential aides, among 
others, claiming that his dismissal was in retaliation for his testimony 
before the Senate a year earlier, where he revealed $2 billion in 
defense department cost overruns, and that the dismissal violated his 
constitutional and statutory rights.166  Determining that absolute 
immunity did not protect the aides, the Supreme Court held that 
officials performing discretionary functions are generally qualifiedly 
immune “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”167 
 
(1993) (stating that qualified immunity “represents the norm” for executive officials 
(internal quotation omitted)); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Wrongs Without 
Remedies: Executive Official Immunity, 62 WASH U. L.Q. 221, 221 (1984) (stating that 
qualified immunity is available to the majority of executive officials). 
 159 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
 160 See id. at 247-48. 
 161 Wood v. Stickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 
8.6.3, at 514. 
 162 See Wood, 420 U.S. at 321-22. 
 163 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 164 Id. at 815-16. 
 165 Nixon, 457 U.S. at 734-35, 739.  Because Nixon is the companion case to Harlow, 
the underlying facts were the same in both cases and the Court recited them in detail 
in Nixon only.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802.  Unlike the defendants in Harlow, however, 
the President received absolute immunity for his actions in office.  Compare Harlow, 
457 U.S. at 802-03, with Nixon, 457 U.S. at 747.  See also supra note 156 (including 
presidential immunity among the available absolute immunity defenses). 
 166 Nixon, 457 U.S. at 734. 
 167 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). 
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In one fell swoop, Harlow eliminated the subjective “good faith” 
prong available under the Schuer test.168  Because the inquiry into the 
subjective motive of an official almost invariably involved a fact 
dispute that Rule 56 summary judgment169 ordinarily could not 
resolve, the Court acknowledged that many courts were therefore 
unable to dispose of such claims early on using summary judgment.170  
The Court concluded that the subjective test was “incompatible with 
our admonition . . . that insubstantial claims should not proceed to 
trial.”171  The Court refused to allow a litigant to impose the social 
costs of § 1983 litigation, including the “burdens of broad-reaching 
discovery,”172 by bringing forth “bare allegations of malice.”173  The 
doctrinal shift toward cost avoidance had clearly tipped the balance 
away from the protection of individual citizens’ rights.174  Essentially, 
the removal of the subjective prong means that an official can 
conduct herself with bad faith or malice, even egregiously so, as long 
as she does not violate a clearly established constitutional or federal 
right.175 
Since Harlow, the Court has steadily rendered pro-defendant 
decisions that have further strengthened the qualified immunity 
defense for government officials.176  For example, a plaintiff may not 
 
 168 Id. at 817-18. 
 169 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).  Rule 56 authorizes the court to render summary 
judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Id. 
 170 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. 
 171 Id. at 815-16 (internal citation omitted). 
 172 Id. at 818. 
 173 Id. at 817. 
 174 See id. at 816. 
 175 PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 871 (2d ed. 1983) (arguing that by removing the subjective 
prong, the effect of Harlow “may be to allow an unscrupulous official to engage in 
malicious misuse of public authority whenever the relevant legal standards are 
objectively unclear”). 
 176 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 8.6.3, at 521.  The Court’s pro-defendant 
jurisprudence has come under heavy criticism.  See, e.g., id. (“Although a strong case 
can be made for protecting officers, it is troubling to do so unless liability of 
governmental entities is correspondingly expanded.”); Chen, supra note 142, at 99 
(characterizing the litigation battles between plaintiffs and defendants over qualified 
immunity as “an elaborate sideshow . . . that in many cases will do little to advance or 
accelerate resolution of the legal claims”); Achtenberg, supra note 138, at 549 
(positing that the current qualified immunity doctrine is too broad and reflects “the 
will of the current Court” rather than “the will of the enacting Congress”).  Whatever 
merit these and other criticisms of the Court’s conception of qualified immunity may 
have, this Comment’s main focus is not to justify or discredit the Court’s policy 
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rely on state law to ascertain whether a federal or constitutional right 
was clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct, even 
though the state right may be analogous to, or even derived from, a 
federal statute or the Constitution.177  In addition, when examining 
the reasonableness of an official’s conduct, the Court has fallen short 
of demanding exact factual identity but nonetheless has required that 
the conduct be considered at a rather low level of generality.178  
Indeed, the Court has focused quite narrowly on the specific conduct 
of the official when asking whether a “reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”179  Finally, the 
Court has held that determinations of qualified immunity are usually 
questions of law that are immediately appealable in order to better 
protect defendants’ immunity from suit.180  All of these decisions have 
reinforced the goal of limiting or eliminating the social costs of 
allowing the discovery and trial stages of litigation to proceed against 
government officials facing meritless § 1983 claims.181 
IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CONVERGES ON NOTICE PLEADING—THE 
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE MEETS THE IMMOVABLE OBJECT 
Given the potential for tension between a notice pleading 
system, whose default position allows for relatively easy access to 
courts and liberal discovery, and an immunity doctrine that 
encourages the speedy resolution of claims, it is not surprising that 
many lower courts have relied on judicial innovations such as 
independently created heightened pleading standards.182  By 
 
determinations; rather, this Comment seeks to reconcile, to the extent possible, the 
conflicting policies behind qualified immunity and notice pleading.  See infra Parts IV 
and V.  Thus, this Comment’s final conclusion that the three-step scheme should be 
implemented is not intended to be a value-driven recommendation; instead, it is 
merely a reasoned compromise solution to a vexing divergence of policies.  See infra 
Parts V.A, B, and C. 
 177 Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194-96 (1984).  But see id. at 193 n.11 (stating 
that “[s]tate law may bear upon a claim under the Due Process Clause when the 
property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are created by state 
law”). 
 178 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987). 
 179 Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
 180 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-30.  For a more detailed account of when and why 
denials of qualified immunity are immediately appealable, see Kathryn R. Urbonya, 
Interlocutory Appeals from Orders Denying Qualified Immunity: Determining the Proper Scope 
of Appellate Jurisdiction, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (1998). 
 181 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 8.6.3, at 521. 
 182 See infra Parts IV.A, B, and C; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589 
(1998) (holding that lower courts cannot impose a heightened evidentiary standard 
on § 1983 claims); Chen, supra note 142, at 74 (“Once the Supreme Court 
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requiring that the complaint be particularized, some courts have 
admittedly weeded out claims.183  The Supreme Court, however, has 
consistently demonstrated that it is even more reluctant to act 
contrary to the Rules than it is zealous in protecting qualified 
immunity.184 
A. Establishing the Defendant’s Pleading Burden and Setting the Stage 
for the Fight to Come 
In Gomez v. Toledo,185 the Court established that qualified 
immunity is an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise in 
the answer.186  In Gomez, police agent Carlos Gomez brought a § 1983 
action against the police superintendent, claiming a violation of his 
procedural due process rights.187  Gomez alleged that he had been 
discharged for testifying in a criminal proceeding about misconduct 
committed by other officers.188  The district court dismissed the claim, 
concluding that because the superintendent was entitled to qualified 
immunity for discretionary official actions carried out in good faith,189 
the plaintiff failed to state a claim by not alleging bad faith.190  The 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal.191 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff in a § 
1983 case must allege merely that some person deprived her of a 
federal right and that the person was acting under the color of state 
law.192  Furthermore, the Court found that the plaintiff is under no 
obligation to anticipate the defense of qualified immunity by 
pleading that the official was motivated by bad faith.193  Rather, the 
Court pointed out, the Rules place the burden squarely on the 
 
acknowledged . . . that discovery would be necessary to adjudicate some qualified 
immunity claims, it laid the groundwork for substantial confusion among the lower 
courts.”). 
 183 See, e.g., GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 
1998); Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 184 For an exploration of Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, see infra Parts IV.C and D. 
 185 446 U.S. 635 (1980). 
 186 Id. at 640-41. 
 187 Id. at 636. 
 188 Id. at 637. 
 189 At the time of Gomez, the inquiry into qualified immunity was governed by the 
subjective/objective Schuer test.  Gomez, 446 U.S. at 641.  The subjective “good faith” 
portion was eliminated in Harlow, two years after Gomez was decided.  See Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 818; supra text accompanying notes 167-70. 
 190 Gomez, 446 U.S. at 637-38. 
 191 Id. at 638. 
 192 Id. at 640. 
 193 Id. 
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defendant to plead any “matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense.”194 
Although Gomez did not address the imposition of a particularity 
requirement, the Court recognized the fundamental incongruity of 
requiring the plaintiff to respond in advance to a legal argument that 
had not yet been presented.195  In a notice pleading regime, a plaintiff 
can hardly be expected to anticipate a response to a claim of which 
the defendant has not been given notice.196  Later holdings that dealt 
specifically with a judicially imposed heightened pleading standard in 
the complaint would echo this untenable premise.197 
B. Clarifying the Plaintiff’s Pleading Burden 
In Siegert v. Gilley,198 the Supreme Court passed on an opportunity 
to determine the propriety of a heightened pleading standard in 
qualified immunity cases.199  Instead, the Court sidestepped the 
heightened pleading issue, concluding that the complaint in Siegert 
failed to satisfy even the minimal pleading burden established in 
Gomez.200  In Siegert, plaintiff Frederick Siegert, a clinical psychiatrist 
employed by the federal government, initiated a Bivens action201 
against his former supervisor for writing an allegedly defamatory 
recommendation letter.202  Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that his 
supervisor’s letter was motivated by bad faith in contravention of his 
Fifth Amendment “liberty interests.”203 
The defendant moved to dismiss and alternatively for summary 
judgment, maintaining that Siegert’s factual allegations did not 
amount to the violation of any constitutional right.204  The defendant 
further contended that, in any event, he was protected by qualified 
immunity.205  The district court denied the motions and instead 
 
 194 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)). 
 195 See id. 
 196 See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640-41. 
 197 See infra Parts IV.C and D (discussing Leatherman and Swierkiewicz). 
 198 500 U.S. 226. 
 199 Id. at 231. 
 200 Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 192-94 (describing the minimal 
allegations required under Gomez). 
 201 For the purposes of this Comment, Bivens actions raise the identical pleading 
and qualified immunity issues as § 1983 actions.  See supra note 2 (discussing Bivens 
actions). 
 202 Siegert, 500 U.S. at 228-29. 
 203 Id. at 229. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
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ordered limited discovery.206  When the defendant requested a stay of 
discovery pending determination of his assertion of qualified 
immunity, the court responded that Siegert’s allegations constituted 
a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.207  Therefore, 
the court found qualified immunity inapplicable.208  The defendant 
immediately appealed the denial of qualified immunity.209 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and 
remanded, ordering the lower court to dismiss.210  First, the court 
determined that, absent malice by the supervisor, the alleged conduct 
did not infringe on a constitutional right.211  Furthermore, to the 
extent that improper motive was an element of the defamation claim, 
the court held that the plaintiff failed to plead with sufficient 
particularity to overcome the qualified immunity defense.212 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Supreme 
Court, ultimately affirmed the court of appeals’ dismissal, but not 
because Siegert had failed to support his allegation of malice by 
pleading specific facts.213  Rather, the Court pointed out that Siegert’s 
allegations failed at an even earlier juncture because they did not 
state a claim of a constitutional violation.214  The Court determined 
that while his allegations may have satisfied state law defamation 
claims, freedom from injury to reputation was not, by itself, a 
constitutional right.215  The Court instructed that before even 
considering whether the alleged right was “clearly established,” and 
thereby implicating the qualified immunity defense, the lower court 
should have first determined whether the government official 
violated a constitutional right at all.216 
The Chief Justice explained that such a “purely legal question 
permits courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the test 
without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity 
to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend 
 
 206 Id. at 229-30. 
 207 Id. at 230. 
 208 Siegert, 500 U.S. at 230. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at 230-31. 
 213 Id. at 232. 
 214 Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231. 
 215 Id. at 232; see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02 (1976) (asserting that 
there is “no constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by a public official 
into a deprivation of [a constitutional right]” and concluding that reputation by itself 
is not protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments). 
 216 Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232. 
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the suit on its merits.”217  The Court indicated that the court of 
appeals incorrectly assumed that Siegert had indeed alleged a 
constitutional violation and, therefore, improperly reached the 
merits of the qualified immunity defense.218  Although the D.C. 
Circuit was ultimately correct in dismissing the suit, the Court 
concluded that the manner in which the circuit reached that result 
deviated from the policy of cost avoidance.219  According to the Court, 
by haphazardly presupposing a constitutional violation, the circuit 
failed to make the thorough threshold determination that would 
have halted the suit and avoided the costs that followed.220  In 
confining its holding to the initial determination of the existence of a 
constitutional right, the Court avoided addressing the court of 
appeals’ imposition of a heightened pleading standard.221 
Justice Kennedy, however, in a concurrence, found merit in the 
use of a heightened pleading standard to dispose of § 1983 cases 
where, as in defamation, the subjective intent of the defendant is an 
element of the claim.222  Justice Kennedy recognized “the tension 
between [Harlow’s objective test] and the requirement of malice,” and 
opined that “the heightened pleading standard is the most workable 
means to resolve it.”223  Although the concurrence conceded that 
requiring a particularized complaint in § 1983 cases is not prescribed 
by the Rules, Justice Kennedy argued that protecting the substantive 
defense of qualified immunity demanded a departure from the 
normal pleading and summary judgment rules.224 
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy’s recommended practice bears a 
striking resemblance to the practice devised in Schultea.225  After the 
plaintiff asserts that a constitutional or statutory right has been 
violated and the defendant responds by pleading qualified immunity, 
the Justice explained, “the plaintiff must put forward specific, 
 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id.; see also supra Parts III.A and B (discussing the doctrinal shift to cost 
avoidance as the leading policy justification for qualified immunity). 
 220 Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232. 
 221 See id. at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 222 Id. at 235-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A]voidance of disruptive discovery is 
one of the very purposes for the official immunity doctrine, and it is no answer to say 
that the plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to engage in discovery.  The 
substantive defense of immunity controls.”). 
 225 Compare Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring), with Schultea, 47 F.3d 
at 1433 (citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as support for the three-step pleading 
scheme). 
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nonconclusory factual allegations which establish malice, or face 
dismissal.”226  Justice Kennedy, however, conceded that his 
recommendation represents “a departure from the usual pleading 
requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b).”227  
Nevertheless, as Justice Kennedy’s statements underscored, the very 
fact that judges have felt pressured into creating heightened pleading 
standards and other burdens in order to dispose of meritless § 1983 
cases exposes the strain between qualified immunity and notice 
pleading.228  Eventually, a mechanism must be devised to replace, or 
at least compliment, the inadequate barriers to litigation provided by 
the Gomez/Siegert burden of pleading the violation of a clearly 
established constitutional statutory right. 
C. The Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects a Heightened Pleading 
Standard . . . but Leaves a Loophole 
A judicially imposed heightened pleading standard in a § 1983 
action finally caught the direct attention of the Supreme Court in 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit.229  In Leatherman, several homeowners alleged that local police 
officers conducted illegal searches during which they assaulted one 
homeowner and destroyed another’s property.230  The homeowners 
brought § 1983 actions against several officers and the county, 
claiming that the alleged misconduct violated their Fourth 
Amendment rights.231  Additionally, the plaintiffs contended that the 
municipality should be liable for allegedly failing to properly train 
the officers.232 
 
 226 Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 227 Id.; cf. infra Part V.B (demonstrating that the Schultea scheme oversteps the 
judicial authority conferred by the Rules). 
 228 See infra Parts IV.C and D. 
 229 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 230 Id. at 165. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).  Oddly, whereas 
individual official liability has progressively been foreclosed upon by immunity 
doctrines, municipal liability has been treated much differently.  Mark R. Brown, 
Correlating Municipal Liability and Official Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 625, 631 (1989).  Initially, the Court held that a municipality was not a “person” 
under § 1983 and, therefore, could not be held liable for the actions of its officials.  
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961).  Seventeen years later, in Monell, the 
Court overturned Monroe and reinstated municipal liability where an official’s 
injurious conduct was undertaken pursuant to the local government’s “official 
policies or established customs.”  Monell, 436 U.S. at 707-08.  Furthermore, the Court 
later held that although municipalities are not subject to respondeat superior 
liability, neither are they entitled to qualified immunity.  Id. at 691; Owen v. City of 
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The district court dismissed the claims, and the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, because the plaintiffs failed to meet the 
heightened pleading standard required by Fifth Circuit precedent.233  
The plaintiffs appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.234  
Finally, a judicially imposed particularity requirement was directly 
before the Court.235 
After reaffirming the premise that municipalities, unlike 
officials, are not entitled to an immunity defense,236 the Court 
considered the municipality’s argument that, out of necessity, the 
level of specificity required under the Rules should be greater where 
the underlying substantive law has grown more intricate.237  
According to the defendant, plaintiffs “must do more than plead a 
single instance of misconduct” to establish municipal liability under § 
1983.238  Consequently, the municipality contended, the Fifth Circuit’s 
“heightened pleading standard” was mislabeled and was not actually a 
deviation of the Rules at all.239 
 
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).  As a result, municipalities, unlike 
government officials, receive some immunity from liability rather than immunity 
from suit.  Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166.  The Court’s handling of municipal liability 
has been subject to criticism from both sides of the governmental liability debate.  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, §§ 8.5.1, 8.5.3, at 477-78, 491.  On one hand, restricting 
governmental liability reduces incentives for local government to ensure that their 
officials act lawfully.  Id.  On the other hand, if the goal of immunity is to avoid the 
costs of § 1983 litigation, it does not then make logical sense to allow proceedings 
against municipalities to reach discovery and trial.  Id.  For an exploration of the 
peculiar consequences caused by the disparity between municipal and individual 
liability and an argument for reform that would more closely align the two, see 
generally Brown, supra. 
 233 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165.  For a further exploration of the development of 
the Fifth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard, see Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d 
552 (5th Cir. 1989); Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1987); 
Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985); Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 
F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1985).  In Morrison, the Fifth Circuit summed up its heightened 
pleading standard: 
[L]iberal notions of notice pleading must ultimately give way to 
immunity doctrines that protect us from having the work of our public 
officers chilled or disrupted. . . . [T]he complaint must allege “with 
particularity all material facts on which [the claimant] contends he will 
establish his right to recovery, which will include detailed facts 
supporting the contention that the pleas of immunity cannot be 
sustained.” 
761 F.2d at 244 (quoting Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1482 (alteration in original)). 
 234 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. at 166; see also supra note 232 (describing municipal liability under § 1983). 
 237 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167. 
 238 Id.; see also supra note 232 (describing municipal liability under § 1983). 
 239 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167. 
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The Court summarily rejected the municipality’s argument and 
unanimously reversed the decision.240  Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the Court, recognized that “the [Fifth Circuit’s] 
heightened pleading standard is just what it purports to be: a more 
demanding rule for pleading a complaint under § 1983 than for 
pleading other kinds of claims for relief.”241  The Court found the 
standard “impossible to square” with the prevailing notice pleading 
regime.242  Although the Chief Justice acknowledged two instances, in 
cases of fraud or mistake, where the Rules require a particularized 
complaint,243 he also pointed out that the Rules did not contain any 
provisions for a similar particularity requirement for § 1983 
complaints against municipalities.244  According to the Court, explicit 
authority provided in one instance necessarily implied that it was 
excluded in others, or “[e]xpressio unius est exclusio alterius.”245  
Moreover, the Court suggested that were the Rules to be rewritten, 
perhaps the drafters would include § 1983 claims against 
municipalities among those required to be plead with particularity, 
but “that is a result which must be obtained by the process of 
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”246  In 
the meantime, the Chief Justice concluded, lower federal courts 
would have to rely on summary judgment and limited discovery to 
dispose of frivolous claims.247 
Unfortunately, the Court expressly declined to address whether 
a heightened pleading standard is appropriate where individual 
government officials may be protected by qualified immunity.248  The 
Court even went as far as to follow the trajectory of the Fifth Circuit’s 
pleading standard, tracing its origins from § 1983 cases against 
individuals249 to its extension over claims against municipalities.250  
Nevertheless, the Court purposefully fell short of applying to all cases 
its prohibition against judicially imposed heightened pleading 
 
 240 Id. at 164. 
 241 Id. at 167 (internal quotations omitted). 
 242 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 243 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)). 
 244 Id. at 168. 
 245 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. 
 246 Id. (emphasis added). 
 247 Id. at 168-69. 
 248 Id. at 166-67. 
 249 Id. at 167 (citing Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1473); see also supra note 233 (listing Fifth 
Circuit cases developing the heightened pleading standard ultimately struck down in 
Leatherman). 
 250 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167 (citing Palmer, 810 F.2d 517). 
  
418 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:389 
standards.251  Some courts have read the Leatherman opinion as a fairly 
broad rejection of particularized pleadings,252 especially focusing on 
where Chief Justice Rehnquist contrasted the authority under Rule 
8(a)(2) to that under Rule 9(b).253  Many courts, however, have taken 
advantage of the Leatherman loophole to prolong their own practices 
of requiring a particularized complaint in § 1983 cases against 
government individuals.254  And so the intractable conflict has 
remained: courts, judges, attorneys, and litigants continued to find 
themselves caught between the immovable object of the notice 
pleading regime and the irresistible force that is the doctrine of 
qualified immunity. 
D. The Final Bell Tolls for Judicially Imposed Heightened Pleading 
Standards 
Judge-made heightened pleading standards met their ultimate 
demise in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.255  Although not a § 1983 case, 
Swierkiewicz made unmistakably clear that the Supreme Court would 
no longer countenance extra-authoritative tinkering with the Rules’ 
pleading requirements.256 
In Swierkiewicz, the plaintiff, a Hungarian native, filed suit against 
his former employer, a private reinsurance company, for allegedly 
terminating him because of his nationality in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,257 and because of his age in violation of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.258  The district 
court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff failed to allege 
facts with sufficient particularity that could lead to an inference of 
discrimination.259  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege 
sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination per the circuit’s established requirement.260  On 
 
 251 See id. at 166-67. 
 252 See supra note 12 (listing courts). 
 253 See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. 
 254 See supra notes 12, 16 (listing courts construing Leatherman narrowly to reach 
only § 1983 municipality cases). 
 255 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 256 See id. at 513-14. 
 257 Id. at 509 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994)). 
 258 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994)). 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id.  The Second Circuit had required that, to avoid dismissal, an employment 
discrimination complaint must allege: “(1) membership in a protected group; (2) 
qualification for the job in question; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) 
circumstances that support an inference of discrimination.”  Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 
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appeal, the Supreme Court considered the propriety of heightened 
pleading standards in the employment discrimination context and, 
ultimately, in a broader spectrum of actions.261 
A unanimous Supreme Court soundly rejected the Second 
Circuit’s imposition of a specificity requirement.262  First, Justice 
Thomas, writing for the Court, explained that prior precedent 
establishing criteria for a prima facie employment discrimination 
claim was “an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”263  
Next, the Court declared that it was never appropriate for a federal 
court to go beyond the boundaries of the Rules when crafting 
pleading requirements.264  The Court reasserted that federal courts 
are subject to the notice pleading regime; admittedly, the Court 
noted, the Rules have a few special exceptions where particularity in 
the complaint is required, namely Rule 9(b) actions for fraud or 
mistake, but those exceptions are explicitly authorized.265  Justice 
Thomas emphasized that, like § 1983 actions against municipalities at 
issue in Leatherman, employment discrimination claims were not 
included in Rule 9(b).266  Also, as in Leatherman, the Court refused to 
extend the Rule 9(b) exceptions to any other context absent an 
amendment to the Rules.267 
The Swierkiewicz case, and the cases that preceded it,268 
demonstrate the uneasy tension that permeates the adjudication of 
the qualified immunity defense.269  By categorically forbidding lower 
federal courts to use a heightened pleading standard absent 
authorization from the Rules, the Court has made the extent of lower 
court authority very clear: if another method of disposing of § 1983 
cases emerges, it must come from a source other than willful 
judges.270  Until the time when that method is made available, courts 
must utilize the procedures currently available, most notably 
 
510 (citations omitted).  The plaintiff was required to plead specific facts in support 
of each element.  Id. 
 261 Id. at 509-10. 
 262 Id. at 510. 
 263 Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)). 
 264 See id. at 513. 
 265 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512-13 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)). 
 266 Id. at 513. 
 267 Id. at 513, 515. 
 268 See supra Parts IV.A, B, and C (detailing Gomez, Siegert, and Leatherman). 
 269 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15 (acknowledging that there may be practical 
arguments supporting a heightened pleading standard in some contexts but 
concluding that such a standard is impermissible under the current Rules). 
 270 Id. 
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summary judgment and restricted discovery.271  Considering that 
courts juxtaposed between notice pleading and qualified immunity 
have been rather resourceful in devising a multitude of now 
discredited practices for easing the tension, it appears likely that 
something will have to give.  The three-step pleading scheme could 
be an ideally pragmatic solution. 
V. THE THREE-STEP PLEADING SCHEME—ANOTHER STEP IN THE AGE-
OLD DANCE 
The three-step pleading scheme can trace its beginnings to the 
city of Tomball, Texas in early 1992.272  Joseph M. Schultea, then the 
police chief in Tomball, began looking into reports that councilman 
David Wood was engaged in criminal activity.273  Upon 
recommendations by Tomball’s city manager and municipal counsel, 
Schultea reported the findings of his investigation to a state oversight 
agency.274  When Wood and some fellow council members discovered 
Schultea’s actions, they proposed that the city council take adverse 
action against Schultea.275  After a closed council meeting, Schultea 
was demoted to assistant police chief.276 
After several requests for an appeal were denied, Schultea filed a 
§ 1983 suit.277  In his complaint, Schultea alleged that his demotion 
impaired his “property and liberty interests” in violation of his due 
process rights.278  Also, the plaintiff alleged that the council members 
infringed his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for 
contacting the state agency.279  After the district court refused to 
dismiss the claims on qualified immunity grounds, the council 
members filed an interlocutory appeal.280 
Although a panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision 
allowing the First Amendment claim to proceed, the panel diverged 
from the district court’s handling of the alleged due process 
violation.281  The panel held that, inter alia, Schultea’s claims were 
insufficient to show an infringement of his liberty interest in his 
 
 271 Id. 
 272 Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1428 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. at 1428-29. 
 276 Id. at 1429. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1429. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. 
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employment.282  Specifically, the court concluded that Schultea’s 
claim that his constitutionally protected employment rights had been 
frustrated was inadequate because he failed to allege that he was a 
contract employee.283  In addition, the complaint did not state a claim 
for wrongful demotion without further allegations that the demotion 
resulted in decreased pay or the loss of fringe benefits.284  The panel 
remanded with allowances for Schultea to amend his complaint to 
state his “best case.”285  In so holding, the panel concluded that 
because the Supreme Court had confined Leatherman to cases against 
municipalities, it did not displace the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that 
“complaints [in § 1983 actions against individual officials] be pled 
with ‘factual detail and particularity.’”286 
Circuit Judge Higginbotham, writing for a divided Fifth Circuit 
sitting en banc, disagreed with the panel’s decision.287  The Fifth 
Circuit ultimately reversed the district court on the due process 
claims but remanded with instructions to apply the newly created 
three-step pleading scheme.288  Although this Comment maintains 
that the Fifth Circuit’s logic was flawed,289 it is probative to explore 
the path the court took to reach its conclusions.  The court began by 
briefly recounting the recent history of qualified immunity 
doctrine.290  The court recognized that the particularity requirement 
it had imposed in Elliott v. Perez, 291 where it was applied to a § 1983 
claim against a municipality, had been struck down in Leatherman.292  
Although Judge Higginbotham acknowledged that Leatherman did 
not reach § 1983 claims against individuals, he nonetheless 
announced that the Fifth Circuit would no longer rely on Elliott or 
the Leatherman loophole.293  Instead, the court of appeals decided it 
would employ the Rule 7 reply294 to take the next step in the “age-old 
 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1429. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. at 1430 (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
 287 Id. at 1434. 
 288 Id. 
 289 See infra Part V.B (discussing deficiencies in the Fifth Circuit’s attempted 
validation of the three-step scheme). 
 290 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1431-32. 
 291 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 292 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1430, 1432; see also Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167; supra text 
accompanying notes 240-47. 
 293 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1432; see also supra text accompanying notes 248-54 
(describing the Leatherman loophole). 
 294 FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a) (providing that “the court may order a reply to an 
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dance of procedure and substance, here with the music of qualified 
immunity.”295 
In the majority’s opinion, the reply could serve as the release 
valve for the conflict between notice pleading and qualified 
immunity.296  Although the Rules ushered in the notice pleading 
regime, the common law and code pleading reply was not 
eliminated;297 instead, as Judge Higginbotham pointed out, it was 
“preserved but put on the shelf, seldom to be used.”298  Nevertheless, 
the court determined that because qualified immunity doctrine had 
changed over time, so had “our perception of its practical demands 
upon the Civil Rules moved in tandem.”299  The court explained that 
in the three-step pleading scheme, the reply reemerges, now subject 
to a heightened pleading standard, to play a pivotal role as the third 
step.300 
The three-step scheme begins when the plaintiff files a short and 
plain statement asserting a § 1983 claim that “rests on more than 
conclusions alone.”301  At first blush, the latter part of the description 
of the first step might appear to call for entirely nonconclusory 
allegations in the complaint.302  To the contrary, despite dictum 
suggesting otherwise,303 Judge Higginbotham’s point is that even the 
 
answer”). 
 295 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1430, 1432. 
 296 See id. at 1432 (stating that “[q]ualified immunity’s limits upon access to the 
discovery process creates a new and large role for the Rule 7(a) reply”). 
 297 See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text (describing the reply retained 
by the Rules). 
 298 Id. at 1433.  Judge Higginbotham described the Rule 7 reply as: 
a vestige of pre-1938 common law and code pleading expressly 
preserved in the Civil Rules.  At the heart of the 1938 transition to the 
Civil Rules was the over-arching policy judgment that pleadings would 
henceforth play a far less important role in the winnowing process.  
This reduced role . . . came with the implicit direction to use the 
discovery processes to put flesh on claims and defenses. 
Id. at 1432-33; see also supra Part II (describing the current pleading regime, the 
predecessor regimes, and their differing treatment of replies). 
 299 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434. 
 300 Id. at 1433, 1434. 
 301 Id. at 1433.  Judge Higginbotham maintained that the Rules have always 
“insisted on more than conclusions, and in this sense, have never been a system of 
notice pleading.”  Id. at 1431.  This assertion flies in the face of precedent too 
numerous to list; suffice it to say that the Supreme Court thinks differently.  See, e.g., 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).  In any event, Judge Higginbotham’s 
characterization of the “notice pleading regime” as a misnomer has no effective 
bearing on the three-step scheme.  See infra notes 302-05 and accompanying text. 
 302 See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1431. 
 303 See id. 
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simplest complaint must contain some facts that give the defendant 
notice of the grounds upon which the plaintiff claims to be entitled 
to relief.304  Essentially, this is a merely a restatement of the minimal 
requirements of the Rule 8(a)(2) and does not deviate from its 
prescripts.305 
Next, the defendant government official will presumably plead 
qualified immunity in the answer.306  Finally, “the court may, in its 
discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer 
pleading the defense of qualified immunity.”307  The interplay 
between the second and third step forces both parties to bring 
forward the relevant facts about what actually took place.308  Certainly, 
the plaintiff will be required to divulge the nature of her claim by 
submitting a particularized reply that is “tailored to the assertion of 
qualified immunity and fairly engage[s] its allegations.”309  The court will 
insist that the reply contain specific facts, rather than general 
characterizations, “at least when those factual particulars of the 
alleged actions are known to the plaintiff and are not peculiarly 
within the knowledge of [the] defendants.”310 
The defendant’s answer, however, is what controls the reply.311  
 
 304 See id. 
 305 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 n.4.  The Rules specifically instruct that their 
additional appended forms “are sufficient under the rules and are intended to 
indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate.”  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 84.  Form 9, for example, states a sample claim for negligence: “On June 1, 
1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant 
negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said 
highway.”  FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9, App. of Forms.  Although the claim contains a 
conclusion of law—that the defendant was “negligent”—it nonetheless also contains 
such minimal facts as where and when the incident occurred and that driving was the 
underlying activity that gave rise to the claim.  Id.  Because Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and 
plain statement” requirement applies to the complaint in the first step of the three-
step scheme, these minimal allegations are required to give at least some notice to 
the defendant government official as to when and where the alleged conduct took 
place.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9, App. of Forms.  Additionally, 
the complaint must at least state a claim that the defendant’s actions violated a 
federal or constitutional right.  See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231-32; supra text 
accompanying notes 214-16.  Then, in the second step, the defendant has the 
opportunity to explain her role, if any, in the incident.  See infra text accompanying 
notes 311-14. 
 306 See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433-34; see also supra note 22 (explaining that the 
defendant is not obligated to allege qualified immunity, but that the three-step 
scheme does not apply otherwise). 
 307 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433-34. 
 308 See id. at 1433. 
 309 Id. (emphasis added). 
 310 Id. at 1432. 
 311 Id. at 1433. 
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Presumably, the defendant will want the plaintiff to bring forward all 
of the particulars of her claim without the need of discovery, 
therefore potentially avoiding significant pre-trial litigation costs.312  
In the three-step scheme, the reply need only speak to the level of 
specificity of the operative allegations put forth in the answer.313  
Thus, the Fifth Circuit explained, the defendant is provided with “an 
incentive to plead his defense with some particularity because it has 
the practical effect of requiring particularity in the reply.”314 
Once the allegations have been elaborated upon, the judge can 
render judgment as a matter of law if it is appropriate.315  That is, the 
court should dismiss the complaint if the pleadings raise no genuine 
issue as to whether the defendant’s conduct amounted to a violation 
of a clearly established federal or constitutional right about which a 
reasonable person should have known.316  If the plaintiff has indeed 
stated a claim that calls into question the legality of the defendant’s 
conduct, the court may order limited discovery confined to the 
qualified immunity defense.317 
Given the ability of the second and third step to clarify the 
nature of the allegations on both sides, Judge Higginbotham warned 
district courts to follow the three-step scheme in almost all § 1983 
cases against a government official.318  The court advised that 
protecting qualified immunity is of great importance, and, therefore, 
“a district court’s discretion not to do so is narrow indeed when 
greater detail might assist.”319 
The Fifth Circuit avoided Leatherman (and, in effect, 
 
 312 See id. at 1433; see also supra Part III.C (noting that cost avoidance for the 
defendant has become the dominant policy reason supporting qualified immunity). 
 313 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433. 
 314 Id. 
 315 See id. at 1434. 
 316 Id.  Technically speaking, the defendant would seek a “judgment on the 
pleadings.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).  Rule 12(c), in turn, directs the court to treat the 
motion as if it were one for Rule 56(c) summary judgment only if “matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.”  Compare FED. R. CIV. 
P. 12(c), with FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (instructing the court to consider pleadings as well 
as “depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions . . . [and] affidavits”).  
Naturally, unless some discovery is absolutely necessary, a court employing the three-
step scheme will want to avoid that scenario.  See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434.  Of course, 
if the purpose of qualified immunity is to avoid litigation costs, then when rendering 
judgment as a matter of law, “it is no answer to say that the plaintiff has not yet had 
the opportunity to engage in discovery.”  Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 317 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434. 
 318 See id. at 1433-34. 
 319 Id. 
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Swierkiewicz)320 by circumventing the limitations of Rule 9(b).321  
Instead, the court maintained that the three-step scheme is valid 
because a heightened pleading standard is applied only to the Rule 7 
reply.322  According to Judge Higginbotham, the only restriction on 
the level of factual specificity that a court may demand in a reply is 
Rule 8(e)(1)’s specification “that ‘[e]ach averment of a pleading 
shall be simple, concise, and direct.’”323  Highlighting that Rule 9(b) 
particularized complaints are likewise governed by the same “simple, 
concise, and direct” standard, the court did not consider Rule 
8(e)(1) as a limitation on Rule 7 replies.324 
Next, the court asserted that Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain 
statement” standard also did not apply to replies; instead, the court 
explained, “Rule 8 applies only to the subset of pleadings that ‘set[] 
forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim.’”325  The court invoked the same 
principle that the Supreme Court relied on to strike down the 
heightened pleading standard in Leatherman—expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius.326  That is, Rule 8(a)(2)’s limitations were not 
germane because the list of pleadings did not specifically include 
Rule 7 replies.327 
A. Why Schultea is Right 
There are several reasons why the three-step pleading scheme is 
a desirable solution to the problem caused by qualified immunity 
converging on notice pleading.328  Admittedly, the reasons are based 
on policy considerations as opposed to a strict adherence to the Rules 
or to Supreme Court precedent.329  Nevertheless, the reasons present 
a compelling case for why the three-step pleading scheme, with a 
minor adjustment,330 ought to be adopted.  First, the scheme furthers 
 
 320 See supra note 18 (noting that Schultea was decided prior to Swierkiewicz). 
 321 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1432, 1434. 
 322 Id. at 1432-33. 
 323 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(1)). 
 324 Id.; see also infra note 370 (describing Judge Higginbotham’s contention that 
Rule 8(e)(1) fails to provide a “relevant restriction” on Rule 7(a) replies). 
 325 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)) (alteration in original). 
 326 Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 245 (quoting Leatherman). 
 327 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433. 
 328 For case law demonstrating the difficulty in reconciling qualified immunity 
and notice pleading, see supra Part IV. 
 329 See infra Part V.B (demonstrating that the Schultea scheme exceeds the 
boundaries of the Rules as interpreted by the Supreme Court). 
 330 See infra notes 380-84, 388, and accompanying text (advocating a mandatory 
rather than discretionary reply). 
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the overarching goal of cost avoidance by encouraging a 
determination of the qualified immunity issue at the earliest possible 
juncture, the pleading stage.331  Second, although unequivocally more 
friendly to defendants,332 the scheme treats both sides in § 1983 cases 
more fairly than do the alternatives, such as subjecting the defendant 
to even limited discovery333 or imposing a heightened pleading 
standard on complaints.334 
When dealing with issues of qualified immunity, the primary 
consideration is social cost avoidance.335  In developing qualified 
immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court has clearly settled on 
avoiding the imposition of costs on government defendants (and 
thereby indirectly on society) who may face lawsuits as the result of 
performing their legally required job obligations.336  The current 
policy of disposing of frivolous claims early using limited discovery 
and summary judgment, however, creates a paradox: the Court has 
emphasized early termination of § 1983 cases while simultaneously 
demanding rigid adherence to the strictures of notice pleading.337  
Unlike the current system, the three-step scheme has the advantage 
of making the qualified immunity determination a more reaching 
threshold inquiry.338  In fact, as Judge Higginbotham pointed out, the 
three-step scheme does not entirely displace the current tools of 
limited discovery and summary judgment.339  Rather, the scheme 
simply provides the judge another tool with which to weed out 
frivolous suits before the costly discovery process has commenced.340 
The three-step pleading scheme is also desirable because it 
spreads the burden of pleading between both litigants; the specificity 
 
 331 See infra notes 335-40 and accompanying text (discussing how the scheme can 
potentially dispose of meritless claims). 
 332 See infra notes 359-62 and accompanying text (explaining that the scheme 
favors defendant government officials). 
 333 See infra notes and accompanying text 341-43 (describing the deficiencies of 
limited discovery). 
 334 See infra notes 344-46 and accompanying text (describing the deficiencies of a 
heightened pleading standard in the complaint). 
 335 See supra Part III.A (discussing qualified immunity’s policy shift toward 
reducing litigation costs for government officials and society). 
 336 Id. 
 337 See Chen, supra note 142, at 98-99. 
 338 The Supreme Court stated that until the threshold immunity inquiry is 
resolved, discovery should not be allowed.  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.  
Notwithstanding, the current system of resolving the issue of qualified immunity 
relies on “summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious 
claims sooner rather than later.”  Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69. 
 339 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434. 
 340 See id. 
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required in the plaintiff’s reply depends upon, and is proportional to, 
the defendant’s level of particularity in the answer.341  Deciding 
between other alternatives—strictly following the notice pleading 
requirements of the Rules or requiring particularized complaints 
(assuming Rule 9(b) was amended to include § 1983 claims)—
requires choosing one pole or the other on the spectrum between 
the policies underlying qualified immunity and notice pleading.  
Either extreme invariably favors one side of the suit at the expense of 
the other.  The three-step scheme, however, is a choice that falls 
toward the middle of the spectrum, if decidedly nearer to the 
qualified immunity pole.342 
The current choice, ubiquitous notice pleading, favors the 
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant government official because 
of its reliance on discovery.  Specifically, the defendant often must 
relinquish some of her entitlement—freedom from suit—and submit 
to discovery to determine if the entitlement even applies, thereby 
derailing the goal of social cost avoidance.  Such an inherently 
paradoxical relationship is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to 
logically reconcile with a defense that is intended to block pre-trial 
litigation.  In contrast, the three-step pleading scheme fortifies the 
protections for the defendant against having to comply with costly 
discovery, even if it does not eliminate every instance where some 
discovery may be needed.343 
Similarly, imposing a heightened pleading standard on the 
complaint by amending Rule 9(b) would inflict an undue burden on 
the plaintiff.344  The Court has made it abundantly clear that qualified 
immunity is an affirmative defense, not an element of a § 1983 
claim.345  It is improper, then, to base the plaintiff’s initial pleading 
burden on a defense that has not been, and might never be, pleaded 
by the defendant.346 
The three-step scheme, however, does not present the same 
problems.  If, for example, the defendant issues vague denials in the 
 
 341 Id. at 1433; see also Gary T. Lester, Comment, Schultea II—Fifth Circuit’s Answer to 
Leatherman—Rule 7 Reply: More Questions than Answers in Civil Rights Cases?, 37 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 413, 446-49 (1996) (describing the burden shifting in the three-step scheme). 
 342 See infra text accompanying notes 359-62 (explaining that the scheme favors 
defendants). 
 343 See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434. 
 344 See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980) (explaining that there is “no 
basis for imposing on the plaintiff an obligation to anticipate . . . a defense” of 
qualified immunity). 
 345 See id.; supra Part IV.A (discussing Gomez). 
 346 See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 641. 
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answer, then the plaintiff faces a less onerous specificity obligation in 
the reply.347  In such a scenario, the judge may refuse to render 
judgment on the pleadings but instead may proceed to limited 
discovery.348  The defendant, therefore, has an incentive to explain 
her conduct using particular facts to forestall further proceedings.349  
If the answer provides a detailed account of what occurred and why 
the defendant’s conduct deserves qualified immunity, the plaintiff 
“must put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations which 
establish [a constitutional or statutory violation].”350 
For illustration, consider the factual circumstances in Schultea.351  
Assume that the plaintiff had pleaded allegations in a relatively 
conclusory manner: “Defendant city council members violated my 
liberty and property interests by demoting me without due process of 
the law.”  Although the plaintiff’s allegation that he was demoted is a 
factual allegation, the statements that his “liberty and property 
interests” were “violated” and that this violation occurred “without 
due process” are conclusions of law.  This pleading would almost 
certainly satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)’s notice requirement; the defendants 
would have “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim[s] [are] and the 
grounds upon which [they] rest[].”352 
Next, assume that the defendant council members respond by 
pleading qualified immunity supported by detailed factual allegations 
about the council meeting: where and when it occurred, who 
attended, the business that was discussed, whether legal formalities 
were observed, and the reason for the plaintiff’s demotion.  The 
plaintiff would then be required to file a reply that contained 
sufficiently specific allegations “establishing [the] plaintiff’s right of 
recovery, including detailed facts supporting the contention that [a] 
plea of immunity cannot be sustained.”353  Suppose, for example, that 
the plaintiff then alleged in the reply that because he was a contract 
employee, the demotion frustrated his constitutionally protected 
property interest in his employment.354  The trial judge would then 
evaluate the pleadings, taking the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and 
 
 347 See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433; see also Marcus, supra note 31, at 452 (asserting 
that a party “hardly needs specificity to deny a vague allegation”). 
 348 Id. at 1434. 
 349 Id. 
 350 Siegert, 500 U.S. at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 351 See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1428-29; supra text accompanying notes 272-79 
(reporting the relevant facts of Schultea). 
 352 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
 353 Elliot, 751 F.2d at 1482. 
 354 See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1429. 
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ascertain whether they made out a violation of the plaintiff’s “clearly 
established” constitutional or statutory rights.355 
Continuing the illustration, consider that despite the plaintiff’s 
allegation in the reply that he was a contract employee, it was still 
unclear whether the defendants had violated the plaintiff’s rights.  
For example, if the determination of a violation hinged on the 
veracity of the defendants’ account of the council meeting and 
whether there was an irregularity of proper process (e.g., whether the 
plaintiff was wrongfully denied an appeal of the council decision), 
the plaintiff could not be expected without discovery to overcome 
those allegations.356  At this point, counseled Judge Higginbotham, 
limited discovery may be necessary because this determination of 
qualified immunity “turn[s] on facts peculiarly within the knowledge 
of the defendants.”357  Without the reply, the fact that the plaintiff 
had an employment contract may not have surfaced until discovery 
had commenced.  Were the plaintiff not a contract employee, the 
details of the meeting would have been irrelevant and discovery may 
have begun unnecessarily.  Although, in this illustration, the three-
step scheme did not entirely obviate the need for further 
proceedings, the reply narrowed the factual and legal issues to be 
determined.358  This obvious potential for weeding out meritless 
litigation (i.e., if there had been no employment contract) 
exemplifies why the three-step scheme has merit. 
To be certain, as the previous illustration demonstrates, the 
three-step scheme is defendant-friendly; it will erect another barrier 
in the path of § 1983 claimants.359  Indeed, forcing the plaintiff to 
reveal more of her case at an early point in the suit, even forcing her 
 
 355 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 356 Cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (acknowledging that 
certain cases, such as those involving police searches, will often result in conflicting 
allegations making limited discovery possibly appropriate). 
 357 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1432. 
 358 This, of course, is much like the old common law pleading regime.  See supra 
Part II.A.  The three-step scheme would stop at this point, however, rather than 
requiring an exhaustive exchange of responsive pleadings.  See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 
1434.  So long as the plaintiff’s reply “support[s] his claim with sufficient precision 
and factual specificity to raise a genuine issue of the illegality of defendant’s conduct 
at the time of the alleged acts,” limited discovery can commence.  Id. 
 359 If the defendant can eliminate a claim at this early point, this will obviously 
benefit the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 341-58 (identifying cost avoidance as the predominant policy of qualified 
immunity).  But see Lester, supra note 341, at 469-70 (pointing out that the incentive 
for the answer to be pleaded with particularity imposes a new burden on defendants 
and positing that the three-step scheme will “guarantee that lawsuits will take longer 
to complete, not reduce the time or costs for either the defendant or the plaintiff”). 
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to confront the spectre of facts that may be “peculiarly within the 
knowledge and control of the defendant,”360 will often put the 
plaintiff at a decided disadvantage.361  The three-step scheme, 
however, at least provides the plaintiff with the benefits of notice of 
the affirmative defense of qualified immunity and a detailed 
explanation of how and why it applies.362  Requiring heightened 
pleading in the complaint deprives the plaintiff of even this 
explanation from the defendant.  Despite the potential unfairness, 
the policy considerations behind the substantive right of qualified 
immunity demand this deviation from the ordinary notice pleading 
system. 
B. Why Schultea is Wrong 
The Schultea pleading scheme is certainly not immune to 
criticism.363  Most significantly, although the scheme is a desirable 
outcome, it ultimately relies on manipulating the Rules and ignoring 
the Supreme Court’s instruction that particularity requirements be 
mandated by the Rules’ amendment process, not created in the 
course of adjudication.364  Therefore, the scheme, like all of the other 
judicial innovations designed to resolve the conflict between qualified 
immunity and notice pleading, exceeds court authority.365  Also, even 
assuming that the scheme is permissible under the existing Rules, two 
additional unresolved issues remain.  First, Schultea leaves uncertain 
what level of review appellate courts should apply to decisions 
whether to order a reply.366  Second, the lack of a uniform standard 
among the circuits cannot be justified.367 
Although the Fifth Circuit concededly presented a clever 
argument in finding support in the Rules, the argument is flawed.368  
Essentially, the court claimed that it could impose a heightened 
pleading standard, truly an exceptional power in a notice pleading 
 
 360 Gomez, 446 U.S. at 641. 
 361 Id. (“There may be no way for a plaintiff to know in advance whether the 
official has such a belief or, indeed, whether he will even claim that he does.”). 
 362 See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433. 
 363 See, e.g., Lester, supra note 341, at 460-65. 
 364 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15. 
 365 See infra notes 368-79 and accompanying text (explaining that the Rules do not 
authorize the three-step scheme). 
 366 See infra notes 380-84 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertain level of 
appellate review after Schultea). 
 367 See infra notes 385-86 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of uniformity 
if only the Fifth Circuit employed the three-step scheme). 
 368 See generally Lester, supra note 341. 
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system, without express authority from the Rules.369  When searching 
for the standard that governs Rule 7 replies, the court focused on 
Rule 8(a)(2).370  The court pointed out that replies are not included 
in the discrete list of “pleading[s] that set forth a claim for relief.”371  
It is arguable, however, that a reply does, in fact, set forth a claim 
because it supplements a complaint, which by definition sets forth a 
claim.  If so, replies would be subject to Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and 
plain statement” restriction and, therefore, a particularity 
requirement would be improper.372 
More distressing is the court’s assumption of a power that is not 
expressed in the Rules.373  As the review of the history of pleadings has 
demonstrated,374 a heightened pleading standard is clearly an 
extraordinary imposition in our current notice pleading regime.375  
Although the court presumed that the Rules do not affirmatively 
govern the content of Rule 7 replies,376 it is something else altogether 
to presume that the void should be filled by a judicial whim.377  
Because the Fifth Circuit could find no standard to restrict court-
ordered replies, it decided to impose just such a “requirement of 
greater specificity” that Swierkiewicz found so objectionable.378  In a 
notice pleading regime, an exceptional practice requires an 
exceptional mandate: no pleading need be particularized without an 
express directive from the Rules.379 
Further complicating the Schultea scheme are issues with its 
 
 369 See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434. 
 370 Id. at 1433.  In the first part of his defense of the three-step scheme, Judge 
Higginbotham rightly pointed out that Rule 8(e)(1) does not place a “relevant 
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on the judge’s other justifications. 
 371 Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 372 See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513. 
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reply be ‘detailed’”). 
 378 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515. 
 379 See id. at 513-14. 
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potentially inconsistent administration.  Unresolved questions 
remain, for instance, regarding the applicable standard of review of a 
decision not to order a reply.380  Rule 7(a) provides that a court “may 
order a reply”;381 this is the type of permissive judicial action that faces 
“abuse of discretion” review on appeal.382  Judge Higginbotham, 
however, warned that “a district court’s discretion not to [order a 
reply] is narrow indeed when greater detail might assist.”383  What 
exactly the judge meant by “narrow” is unclear but the implication is 
unmistakable: a district court that decides not to require a Rule 7 
reply will face close scrutiny, perhaps even de facto plenary review, of 
that decision.384  Notwithstanding the suspect propriety of a court of 
appeals transforming a discretionary practice into a mandatory one, 
clarification, at a minimum, would help to apprise courts and litigants 
of what level of review to expect when challenging a court’s decision 
whether or not to order a reply. 
The final issue with Schultea is a common refrain whenever 
standards differ among the circuits: there is no logical reason why 
plaintiffs and defendants should face different procedures in 
different courts in the federal system.385  One of the main goals of the 
proponents of the Rules was, after all, to achieve procedural 
uniformity among the federal courts.386  The policies of cost 
avoidance are almost undoubtedly as relevant in all of the federal 
districts as they are in the Fifth Circuit.  Lack of uniformity will 
continue to plague the three-step scheme until Schultea is either 
overturned or adopted into the Rules. 
 
 380 Circuit Judge Garza, in a concurrence, questioned the propriety of the 
majority’s apparent limitation on the district court’s discretion whether to order a 
Rule 7 reply.  Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1437 (Garza, J., specially concurring).  Judge Garza 
concluded that “[s]uch a limitation on the district court’s discretion is not contained 
in Rule 7(a).”  Id.  This concern is resolved by the proposed amendment to the Rules 
provided at the conclusion of this Comment.  See infra Part V.C. 
 381 FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a) (emphasis added). 
 382 Traylor v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 189 F.2d 213, 216 (8th Cir. 1951) 
(holding that the trial court has discretion whether to order a reply); see also supra 
notes 116-21 and accompanying text (describing the Fifth Circuit’s admonition to 
lower courts to order a reply in § 1983 actions). 
 383 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434. 
 384 See id.; see also Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (characterizing 
the standard of review as “abuse of discretion” but reiterating that that discretion is 
“narrow indeed”). 
 385 See, e.g., LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform 
Through Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J. L. 
& TECH. 1, 48 (2002) (asserting that “[i]ncreased uniformity and predictability in 
adjudication almost invariably leads to enhanced judicial credibility and the resultant 
desired effect of stabilization within a given body of law”). 
 386 Holtzoff, supra note 36, at 1062-63; Subrin, supra note 26, at 967. 
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C. Amending the Rules and Righting the Wrong 
The three-step pleading scheme is not a perfect solution; when 
legal doctrines such as qualified immunity and notice pleading 
converge, there seldom are resolutions that please everyone.387  The 
three-step pleading scheme, however, represents a careful balancing 
of the policies involved and a guarded rejection of the other available 
options for resolving the conflict.  Therefore, the scheme should be 
legitimized by amending the Rules.  A proposed draft amendment 
might read like this: 
In actions against a government official where the affirmative 
defense of qualified immunity is raised in the answer, the court 
shall order that the plaintiff file a reply that is tailored to the 
assertion of qualified immunity and fairly engages its allegations. 
There are many reasons for adopting the amendment.  It would 
eliminate the problem of the appropriate standard of review by 
making the particularized reply compulsory in § 1983 cases, 
guaranteeing de novo appellate review of decisions whether to order a 
reply.388  The circuits would no longer lack uniformity because the 
three-step scheme would be applied in all federal courts as a 
mandatory part of the Rules.  Most importantly, however, judges 
trapped between the immovable object of notice pleading and the 
irresistible force of qualified immunity would have another method 
of resolving the dilemma before the next stage of pre-trial litigation. 
Certainly, one criticism of the three-step scheme is only too 
obvious: it resembles the failed pleading regimes that the America 
legal system worked so diligently to escape from.389  A narrow 
resurrection of a past practice, however, is entirely justified when 
irreconcilable fundamental doctrines clash.  Professor Subrin 
perhaps states it best: 
Our infatuation with [the equity-dominated Rules] has helped us 
to forget the historic purpose of adjudication.  Courts exist not 
only to resolve disputes, but to resolve them in a way that takes law 
seriously. . . .  We have, however, largely failed at defining rights 
and providing methods for their efficient vindication.390 
 
 387 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S at. 514-15.  Another appropriate example of an 
ongoing conflict between doctrines is represented by the merger of law and equity; 
the predictability of the common law has not, and may never, mesh entirely with the 
flexibility of equity.  See Subrin, supra note 26, at 1000-02. 
 388 See supra notes 380-84 (discussing the uncertainty of the standard of appellate 
review after Schultea). 
 389 See supra Part II (recounting the transition from prior pleading regimes to the 
Rules). 
 390 Subrin, supra note 26, at 1001. 
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Particularized replies may currently be in disfavor, but they can again 
serve an important purpose by helping to protect public officials’ 
rights to qualified immunity.391  If qualified immunity is truly to be 
immunity from suit, it should not take a lawsuit to make that 
determination; rather, the three-step pleading scheme should be 
formally adopted and implemented. 
 
 
 391 Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433. 
